Continued proliferation of long range missiles and the fielding of sophisticated threats, such as the maneuvering re-entry vehicle, pose challenges for the fielded Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) weapon systems. However, as missile defense has evolved from World War II to the present day, the advent of the digital age and the emergence of a wide variety of non-kinetic techniques create Asymmetric opportunities to augment the BMDS to assist in negation of ballistic missile threats and to rapidly inject Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) actionable decision aids into the often stressful offensive and defensive battle operations.
Kinetic techniques involve projectile weapons (e.g., such as guns, missiles and bombs) destroy targets by kinetic effects (e.g., overpressure, projectile, shrapnel and spalling damage, and incendiary effects). Kinetic weapons use stored chemical energy in propellants and warhead explosives and deliver this energy to a target by means of a projectile of some kind.
Non-kinetic techniques involve nonlethal weapons that do not induce direct physical harm to people. Examples: cyber, directed energy (DE), analogue-to-digital (A-to-D), electronic warfare (EW), decoys. Cyber weapons are delivered digitally. DE weapons deliver a large amount of stored energy from the weapon to the target, to produce structural and incendiary damage effects.
Over the last three years, over 50 trans-Atlantic companies participated in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Industry Advisory Group (NIAG) missile defense study. The purpose of the study was to identify anticipated missile defense capabilities from 2020 to 2030. In other words, the focus of the NATO study is a continuation of kinetic solutions which already struggle with raid size and sophistication. In effect, what the 50 trans-Atlantic NATO companies are saying is the best that industry can their offer their democracies through 2030 is to wait for the threats to launch before acting.
Currently, there are analytical solutions to provide performance assessment of these kinetic solutions. For example, Probability of Single Shot Engagement Kill, PSSEK, which is a measure the effectiveness used in these analytical approaches, is derived considering only kinetic means to neutralize the ballistic missile threat. PSSEK factors in the reliability of the combat system, the reliability of the interceptor, and the ability of the interceptor to intercept the Re-entry Vehicle (RV) of the missile. PSSEK expresses the reliability of the combat system operating correctly (Pes and Pcs), and the probability of the interceptor neutralizing the threat (PSSK). PSSEK is defined as:PSSEK=Pes*(Pcs*)Prel*PCTS*PFOV*Pdiv=Pes*(Pcs*)*PSSK, where
Pes is the probability that the Combat System engagement support services operate correctly which involves probability of detection and track, probability of threat engagement, probability of target designation, and probability of engagement reliability. Pcs is the reliability of the Combat System communication support services operating. Prel is the reliability of the interceptor and kill vehicle, which involves the probability of missile reliability and the probability of kill vehicle (KV) reliability. Pcts is the probability of correct target selection, depending on targeting logic and on-board target selection logic. Pcontain is the probability of the interceptor will be able to contain a threat given the engagement support=PFOV*Pdiv; wherein PFOV is the probability of field of view containment and Pdiv is the probability of divert containment.
However, these current methods for calculating engagement success are notional at best and inaccurate. In addition, the current methods for calculating engagement success promote complex solutions with silver bullet interceptors but low system reliability. New and more comprehensive ways to support operations are needed.
As an example, a system of systems approach rather than just focused enhancements to the combat system, the sensor performance, or the interceptor. This type of comprehensive approach can better support operations to make more informed decisions and to improve overall missile defense. Performance can't be rolled up into a single number. Thus, current methods are not available to assess system of systems performances.
In addition to probabilistic approach to characterizing PSSEK, there have been also been scoring systems developed to assess vulnerabilities of kinetic weapons (e.g. missiles). These systems prioritize vulnerabilities and identify those that pose the greatest risk. One such scoring system is the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) that provides an open framework within which to score vulnerabilities. CVSS provides standardized vulnerability scores. When an organization normalizes vulnerability scores across its software and hardware platforms, it can leverage a vulnerability management policy. This policy may be similar to a service level agreement (SLA) that states how quickly a particular vulnerability must be validated and remediated.
CVSS also provides an open framework. Users can be confused when a vulnerability is assigned an arbitrary score. For example, which properties gave it that score, how does it differ from the one released yesterday, etc. With CVSS, anyone can see the individual characteristics used to derive a score.
CVSS provides prioritized risk such that when the environmental score is computed, the vulnerability becomes contextual. That is, vulnerability scores are now representative of the actual risk to an organization. Users know how important a given vulnerability is in relation to other vulnerabilities. However, CVSS does not provide a method by which to convert these scores into probability distributions. Additionally, because of shrinking economic resources available to the United States (US) and its allies in the foreseeable future, the traditional kinetic-only methods of missile defense need to be reassessed to provide for a broader, more holistic, and achievable approach to missile defense.